



# 5

## **NEEDS AND FUNDING**


The period 2015–2017 saw both the highest ever numbers of people in need and the highest ever expenditure on international humanitarian assistance. As in previous periods, funding was inadequate to meet needs.

## Humanitarian needs

In 2017, an estimated 201.5 million people in 134 countries were assessed as being in need of international humanitarian assistance.<sup>1</sup> Close to a quarter (23%) were living in just three countries – Yemen, Syria and Turkey. This exceeds the 2016 estimate of at least 164.2 million<sup>2</sup> people in need, 27% of whom were again concentrated in three countries, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. These countries received the largest amounts of international humanitarian assistance that year. The figures for 2016 and, especially 2017, are a marked increase on the 124.7 million people assessed as being in need in 2015, although this figure, as well as figures in the last SOHS (2012–14), are not directly comparable.<sup>3</sup> Even so, there does appear to have been a year-on-year increase<sup>4</sup> in the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance across the period. This was driven by complex crises<sup>5</sup> – crises triggered primarily by conflict as well as at least one other type of crisis (disaster associated with natural hazards and/or refugee situations).<sup>6</sup>

With conflict comes displacement, either within or between countries. From 2014 to 2017, the number of people forcibly displaced due to conflict, violence or persecution increased from 59.2 million to 68.5 million. Over the period, the total number of IDPs<sup>7</sup> rose by 6% (from 39.9 million to 42.2 million), and the total number of refugees by 33% (from 17.5 million to 23.2 million). Of the total displaced population, IDPs accounted for 62% in 2017 (down from 67% in 2014), and refugees 34% (up from 30%). Sustaining an established trend, most displaced people<sup>8</sup> were being hosted in middle- and low-income countries<sup>9</sup> (70% and 22% respectively in 2017). The period has seen incremental rises in the proportion of people hosted in lower-income countries (from 15% to 18% to 22% by 2017). High-income countries hosted less than 7% of displaced people across the three years.


**Figure 3 / Displaced populations by host country income, 2015–2017**



Sources: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) data.

Notes: World Bank classification has been used for income groups; the 'Middle Income group' aggregates Upper Middle Income and Lower Middle Income groups. Based on UNRWA data, Palestinian registered refugees are included as refugees for Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and as IDPs for Palestine.


**Figure 4 / Number of people in need and top three countries by region, 2017**



Sources: Development Initiatives based on ACAPS, FAO, GRFC Population in Crisis, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters and UN OCHA.  
 Notes: DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Region naming conventions used throughout this report are primarily based on those used by the OECD DAC; the Middle East and North of Sahara regions have been combined.

Since 2011, the Middle East and North of Sahara<sup>10</sup> has accommodated more displaced people than any other region, with 14.2 million IDPs and 6.8 million refugees in 2017, followed by South of Sahara, with 13.8 million IDPs and 6.3 million refugees.

**Figure 5 / Regions hosting displaced populations, 2008–2017**




Source: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR, UNRWA, and IDMC data.

Notes: OECD country naming has been used for regions, except the Middle East and North of Sahara, which have been combined. According to OECD, Turkey is classified to be in Europe. Based on UNRWA data, Palestinian registered refugees are included as refugees for Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and as IDPs for Palestine. Numbers for Oceania, Fas East Asia and North and Central America represented on average less than 2% of total forcibly displaced people for the period 2008-2017. The regions with the five largest displaced populations over the period 2008-2017 are shown in the chart.

## Volumes of humanitarian assistance

The SOHS 2015 noted pronounced increases in international funding for responses to humanitarian emergencies. The high levels of growth seen in the previous period continued into 2015, with an increase of 16% in one year. As a result, the total volume of international humanitarian assistance increased significantly compared to the previous three-year reporting period: by 2017, total funding was \$27.3 billion – the highest figure ever, and 23% higher than the equivalent sum for 2014. However, funding also appeared to have plateaued, remaining fairly stable for most of the period of the report: from 2015 to 2017, large annual increases were replaced by marginal growth of around 3% per year.

**Figure 6 / International humanitarian assistance, 2013–2017**

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, FTS, CERF and DI's unique dataset for private contributions.

Notes: Figures for 2017 are preliminary estimates. Totals for previous years differ from those reported in previous *Global Humanitarian Assistance* reports due to deflation and updated data and methodology. Data is in constant 2016 prices. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated based on humanitarian expenditure in Figures 8,9,11 and 12.

Private funding grew at a faster rate than institutional funding. Again, compared to the last SOHS period, private funding grew by 30%, and institutional funding by 21%. However, volumes of private funding vary year-on-year, with high-profile sudden-onset crises seemingly driving larger volumes. There was an exceptionally high level of private giving in 2015, possibly in response to the Nepal Earthquake and the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. The growth in private funding was not enough to significantly change the balance between private and institutional funding as proportions of the total (see above).

### Sources of humanitarian contributions

Funding from governments and EU institutions continued to form the majority of humanitarian funding. Overall, institutional contributions make up 76% of the 2017 total, 77% in 2016 and 73% in 2015. This is consistent with the pattern from the three years previously, where institutional contributions made up 75% of international humanitarian assistance in 2012 and 2013, and 77% in 2014.

The majority of institutional funding continued to come from a small group of donors. The largest 20 donors provided 96% of the institutional total in 2017, the same proportion as at the start of the period. Contributions from the three largest donors (the US, Germany and the UK)<sup>11</sup> increased from 53% of total international humanitarian assistance in 2015 to 59% in 2017, representing a further concentration of donors providing the lion's share of contributions.

**Figure 7 / Humanitarian assistance from donor governments, 2017**

US		\$6,683m
Germany		\$2,988m
UK		\$2,518m
EU institutions		\$2,247m
Japan		\$843m
Sweden		\$767m
Canada		\$684m
France		\$682m
Norway		\$653m
Netherlands		\$569m

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, FTS and CERF.

Notes: 2017 data for OECD DAC is preliminary. Contributions of EU member states include an imputed amount of their expenditure (see chapter on components, methods and approach). EU institutions are also included separately for comparison and are shaded differently to distinguish them from government donors. Although Turkey is the largest donor on the basis of the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC (providing \$8,070 million in 2017), this largely comprises expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within the country. As such, it is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance from other donors in this figure (which does not include expenditure on refugees in the donor country) and has not been included.

The SOHS 2015 was positive about the role that Gulf donors could play, particularly in light of the crises then emerging in the Middle East and North of Sahara. The surge in funding reported in 2015 was, however, short-lived, and by 2017 the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the two largest Gulf donors, had dropped off the list of the largest ten contributors of international humanitarian assistance.

### How does the funding get there?

The long-standing trend of directing funding through UN agencies and INGOs in the first instance held throughout the current study period. In 2016, the most recent year for which data is available, the majority of government funding went to UN agencies as first-level recipients, which received \$12.3 billion, equivalent to 60% of the total, the same proportion as in 2015. In contrast, the majority of private contributions – from individuals, trusts, foundations and corporations – were channelled through NGOs (87% of the total), while multilateral organisations received 10%, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent, 3%. These figures are broadly in line with the trend over the past five years.

Current reporting practices make it impossible to track funding down the transaction chain to aid recipients. The new functionalities provided by OCHA FTS have improved traceability, but data beyond first-level recipients is not yet reported comprehensively. Better reporting would help in understanding the volumes passed to implementing partners and the number of transaction layers in the chain, and would provide valuable

**Figure 8 / Funding channels of international humanitarian assistance – first-level recipients, 2016**



Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) data and Development Initiatives' unique dataset for private contributions.

Notes: RCRC: International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. First-level recipient data from government donors and EU institutions uses OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), UN CERF and UN OCHA FTS data. Calculations for total humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors use data from OECD DAC Tables 1, 2a and 'Members' total use of the multilateral system', so totals may differ. 'Public sector' refers both to the OECD definition and reporting to the FTS. OECD DAC CRS codes 'other', 'to be defined' and 'public-private partnerships' are merged to 'other'. Private funding figures use DI's unique dataset on private contributions for humanitarian assistance. Data is in constant 2016 prices.

insight into the quality of funding – how much is multi-year or unearmarked at each transaction layer. This is currently not visible.

The SOHS 2015, which covered the period prior to the WHS and the Grand Bargain commitment to 'localisation', noted limited progress in investment in local and national responders. Funding is only one aspect of localisation, but the Grand Bargain workstream target to channel 25% of total international humanitarian assistance 'as directly as possible' to local and national responders by 2020 (The Grand Bargain, 2016) seems unlikely to be met at current rates of progress.

Based on data reported to FTS, funding directed to local and national responders as first-level recipients rose in 2017 to \$603 million, from \$458 million in 2016.<sup>12, 13</sup> This means they received 2.9% of total international humanitarian assistance in 2017, higher than the 2016 share of 2% but still a long way short of the 2020 target. Most of this funding was directed to national governments (84%, or \$509 million). This left local and national NGOs directly receiving \$85 million, representing 0.4% of all international humanitarian assistance in 2017. Compared to 2016, volumes increased by just 0.1% (\$6 million).

The Localisation Marker Working Group<sup>14</sup> interprets ‘as directly as possible’ to include funds passed through one intermediary – that is, to a second-level recipient. Using this definition, funding provided to local and national responders both directly and through one intermediary totalled \$736 million in 2017, accounting for 3.6% of international humanitarian assistance reported to FTS.<sup>15</sup> This is a marginal increase on 2016, when the figure was \$535 million, or 2.3% of total funding.

Contributions to pooled funds continued to increase, possibly thanks to the momentum generated around the Grand Bargain commitments. An emphasis on the need to provide more unearmarked funding to allow for quicker adjustments to changing needs, along with signatories’ efforts to give funds ‘as directly as possible’ to local responders, may have led to an expectation that a number of Grand Bargain targets could be met through pooled funds.

In 2017, contributions to UN pooled funds were almost double what they were a decade previously, in 2008. Overall volumes reached a record high of \$1.3 billion in 2017, up by 32% on 2015 levels. Funding to the CERF increased by 18% between 2016 and 2017, from \$426 million to \$505 million. While this represents the largest increase since its launch in 2006, both in volume and proportionally, it still leaves the CERF some distance from its \$1 billion by 2018 target.<sup>16</sup> The majority of contributions (two-thirds) to pooled funds in 2017 came from five donors: the UK (\$1.5 billion), Sweden (\$721 million), the Netherlands (\$553 million), Germany (\$532 million) and Norway (\$368 million).

Over 2015–17, contributions to the NGO-led pooled fund, the Start Fund, totalled an estimated \$40 million. While the absolute volumes of funds available through this Fund are small compared to the global total, such mechanisms do enable direct funding to member NGOs.


## Funding against need

The extent to which the consolidated funding requirements of UN appeals are met is often regarded as a proxy measure of the extent to which funding meets humanitarian needs (notwithstanding that additional funding flows beyond appeals may be used to reach the same populations). The collective requirement of UN appeals in 2017 was \$25.2 billion, an increase of 24% (\$4.9 billion) on 2014. Between 2012 and 2014, requests were largely constant around the \$20 billion mark. The increase was primarily driven by larger requests for ongoing crises in Syria, Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria (\$13.8 billion) and new appeals for Ethiopia and Pakistan (\$1.8 billion).

Funding to 2017 appeals also increased, but at a slower rate than requirements. Total funding in 2017 was \$14.9 billion, the largest ever, representing a 24% increase on 2014. However, despite these growing funding volumes there was a shortfall of \$10.3 billion in funding against appeals – again the largest volume to date.



**Figure 9 / Requirements against funding in UN-coordinated appeals (2008–2017)**




Sources: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data.

Notes: 2012 data includes the Syria Regional Response Plan (3RP) monitored by UNHCR. 2015 data does not include the Yemen Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. To avoid double counting of the regional appeals with the country appeals in 2015, the Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan does not include the DRC component, CAR's Regional Refugee Response Plan only includes the Republic of Congo component, and the Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan does not include any country component. 2016 and 2017 data does not include regional appeals tracked via UNHCR (CAR and Yemen in 2016; South Sudan, Burundi and Nigeria in 2016 and 2017). Data is in current prices. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated by crisis, rather than country, in Figures 11 and 14.

This meant that appeals were 59.2% met in 2017, below the 2016 figure of 61% but above the 55% registered in 2015 (which saw the largest proportional shortfall to date, 45%). Only in 2016 did funding reach or exceed the proportion against requirements seen in 2012 (60% met), 2013 (65% met) and 2014 (62% met). There is no clear direction of travel in terms of securing funding against requirements.

The same appeals data allows some cross-country comparison of per person requirements against per person funding. Notwithstanding the data caveats around recording the number of people targeted within appeals, two

**Figure 10 / Requirements and funding per targeted person in UN-coordinated appeals, 2017**



Source: DI based on UN OCHA appeals documents and Financial Tracking System (FTS).

Notes: Only appeals mentioned in the write-up have been visualised. For appeals documents, plan version with the requirements figure closest to that recorded on FTS is used. For Syria and Iraq HRPs, the figure for 'people directly targeted' is used. For Hurricane Irma the 'affected people' figure is used. For Syria 3RP the total figure for refugees in the area is used. For Niger Plan, the 'people in need' figure is used. Data in current prices.

things still stand out: the large difference in amounts requested per person from one appeal to another; and the very different degree to which these requests are met (from 17% to 117%). The average per person requirement across 2017 plans was \$190,<sup>17</sup> higher than the previous SOHS's reported average of \$179, while average funding per person targeted was \$109,<sup>18</sup> marginally above the figure reported in the last SOHS.<sup>19</sup>

### Where did humanitarian funding go?

Over the last decade, humanitarian funding has become increasingly concentrated among a small number of countries. In the period 2015–17, the concentration remained, but did not significantly increase. Based on the most recently available data from the DAC and FTS, the ten largest country recipients of international humanitarian assistance accounted for 60% of both the 2015 and 2016 international humanitarian assistance country-allocable<sup>20</sup> totals. Syria was the largest recipient country for the fifth year in a row, seeing a 23% increase on 2015, to reach \$2.6 billion. Turkey saw the largest growth in volume of humanitarian assistance (up \$604 million,

or 197%), followed by Iraq (\$525 million, 59%) and Greece (\$505 million). Greece and Turkey<sup>21</sup> featured among the ten largest country recipients for the first time due to levels of assistance to the refugee response in these countries. Volumes to Jordan and Lebanon fell by 23% (\$224 million) and 20% (\$160 million), respectively.


The SOHS 2015 report noted the persistence of chronic crises, and this trend did not significantly change in 2015–17. Most funding continues to be absorbed by long-term emergencies.<sup>22</sup> Of the total country-allocable international humanitarian assistance in 2016, the most recent year for which data is available, 86% was directed to long- and medium-term recipients.<sup>23</sup> Close to three-quarters (74%) of the 2016 total went to long-term recipients, higher than 2014, when this group received 71% of the total. Of the 20 largest recipients of humanitarian assistance, 16 were long-term recipients in 2016, compared to 15 in 2014.

Based on data reported solely to OCHA's FTS, analysis of 2017 funding by crisis, rather than by country only, displays a similar concentration from 2014 onwards. In 2013, the five largest emergencies accounted for 48% of total funding. This proportion has increased year-on-year since then, such that, by 2017, 56% of all funding went to five crises: Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Somalia. This progressive concentration of funding was accompanied by a gradual shift in the geographic focus of the top ten recipients,<sup>25</sup> from crises predominantly in South of Sahara to the Middle East and North of Sahara. Volumes of international humanitarian assistance to South of Sahara increased from \$5.2 billion in 2008 to \$7.2 billion in 2017 (38.4%), while countries in the Middle East and North of Sahara received progressively higher volumes each year, from \$960 million in 2008 to \$10.2 billion in 2017 (up 1,097%). The share of international humanitarian assistance going to these two regions increased from 9% to 48% in 2008–17. In South of Sahara, it fell from 50% in 2008 to 34% in 2017.

For the fifth consecutive year, the Syria regional crisis received the largest single-crisis proportion of funding in 2017, despite a 12% decrease in volumes of humanitarian assistance; it accounted for 28% of the total (\$5.7 billion), the same share as in 2016. Yemen's share of humanitarian assistance increased by nine percentage points, from 2% in 2014 to 11% 2016.

Analysis of funding recorded in FTS (2017) by country, and coded by crisis type, shows that most (80%) is spent in countries experiencing conflict alone, or conflict combined with at least one other crisis type. Over half (51%) of all humanitarian assistance was directed to countries experiencing conflict and hosting refugees; 6% went to countries experiencing conflict and natural hazards; and 22% went to countries experiencing complex crises with elements of all three. Only 10% of funding was directed to countries coded as having a single crisis type (conflict alone, natural hazard alone or refugee alone) in 2017, and only 1% (\$147 million) went to countries affected by natural hazards alone.

**Figure 11 / Five emergencies<sup>24</sup> receiving the most international humanitarian assistance (2008–2017)**




Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.

Notes: Bars scaled by volume of international humanitarian assistance reported. Totals are shown by crisis rather than country and, in the cases of Syria, Yemen and South Sudan, funding is for the regional crises. Data is in constant 2016 prices. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated by country, rather than crisis, in Figures 2 and 5, and from those sourced based on appeals only in Figure 9.

### What were funds spent on?

Appeals for refugee responses drove an increase in both requirements and funding under the Multi-Sector<sup>27</sup> category, which both requested and received the largest, and increasing, amounts over 2015–17 – up from \$6.3 billion requested and \$3.5 billion received to \$7.5 billion requested and \$3.9 billion received (20% and 10% of total appeal requirements, respectively). Coverage reached 60% in 2016, but decreased in 2017, to 51%. Food Security continues to attract the largest requests and receive the largest sector-specific contributions (that is, excluding undefined contributions or contributions spanning multiple

**Figure 12 / International humanitarian assistance by crisis type, 2017<sup>26</sup>**




Source: Development Initiatives based on ACAPS, FAO, UNHCR, UNRWA, INFORM Index for Risk Management, CRED and FTS data.  
 Notes: Complex crises in the chart comprise those countries that were marked as having scored the criteria for all three of the types of crisis above (conflict, refugee crisis and 'natural' hazards). 'Other' refers to those recipients that were not specified and therefore could not be coded using DI's methodology. Data in constant prices 2016. Diagram not to scale. Calculations are based on shares of country-allocable humanitarian assistance. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated by crisis, rather than country, in Figures 11 and 14, and from those based on UN appeals only in Figure 9.

sectors), while most other sectors see significantly less investment. Aggregate requirements for the Food Security sector increased from \$4.7 billion in 2015 to \$6.5 billion in 2017; 61% of requirements under Food Security were met in 2017, compared to 53% in 2015. Multi-Sector and Food Security accounted for the largest proportion of total requirements, consistently at 30% and 24% respectively. Overall, the largest funding increases (by percentage) over the period were for Nutrition (272%) and Protection (61%). The sector with the largest funding against requirements was Coordination and Support Services, at 84%. At the other end of the scale, Early Recovery had only 24% coverage in 2017. These two sectors have some of the lowest requirements.

Cash is reported as a modality, rather than a sector. The majority of cash that is reported is captured within Food Security, but the focus on multi-purpose cash means there is as yet no agreement on how to record these activities, whether as part of the existing Cluster classification or outside it.

Cash transfer programming is not yet comprehensively tracked, and current reporting allows for only partial global figures.<sup>28</sup> In 2016, an estimated \$2.8 billion of humanitarian assistance was provided in the form of cash and vouchers,<sup>29</sup> representing a 40% increase on the 2015 estimate

**Figure 13 / Requirements and funding per sector on UN-coordinated appeals – 2015, 2017**




Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data and UN OCHA Humanitarian Clusters criteria.  
 Notes: CCCM: Camp Coordination and Camp Management; NFI: Non-Food Items. 'Humanitarian clusters' have been categorised according to OCHA and IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee). A new category ('Multi-sector') has been created in order to allocate those activities which are related to more than one humanitarian cluster. Please note that those activities whose cluster is not specified on FTS have been categorised as 'Not specified', thus excluded in the final chart due to its nature and because they are not comprehensive. Refugee Response Plans (RRPs) in Burundi, Nigeria and South Sudan for 2017 are thus excluded as UNHCR provides financial requirements by Cluster/technical sector, but not funding data. Other includes agriculture, CWC (Communication with Communities) and Community Restoration. The total requirements for this sectors together represented less than 3% on average for the period 2015-2017. Data is in current prices.


of \$2 billion. Consistency of reporting at recipient country level varies, making any aggregated figures for cash unreliable. However, we can say that, in 2017, 6% and 7% respectively of humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia and Nigeria was in the form of cash, while Zimbabwe, Dominica and Haiti reported 29%, 13% and 11% implemented as cash transfers.<sup>30</sup> Given the caveat on reporting above, no trends can be clearly identified, despite growing recognition of the value of providing cash transfers.

**Figure 14 / Concentration of funding by region (2008–2017)**

#### Middle East and North of Sahara



#### Africa South of Sahara



#### Europe



#### South and Central Asia



#### South America



#### Far East Asia



#### Oceania



#### North and Central America



2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.

Notes: Data is in constant 2016 prices. Totals are shown by crisis rather than country. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated by country and from those based on UN appeals only in Figure 9.

In Somalia, where reporting may be comparatively stronger than for other recipient countries, up to 17% of international humanitarian assistance as reported to FTS contains cash elements, determined on the basis of modality reported (cash or ‘traditional’ aid) and project descriptions. This splits further into 11% wholly or primarily cash-based, and 6% for which cash is one of multiple modalities.

The only data available that provides an indication of investment in disaster preparedness and prevention (DPP) is reported to the DAC. Looking first at 2016, \$738.9 million of official<sup>31</sup> humanitarian assistance was directed towards DPP, representing 3.7% of donors’ official humanitarian contributions that year, a 10% increase compared to 2014 volumes.

Additional non-humanitarian ODA grants are made towards flood prevention and climate change adaptation (CCA) and are similarly identifiable on OECD DAC. Over the 2012–16 period, both disaster preparedness and flood prevention increased at a smaller rate (up by 22% and 18% respectively) than climate change adaptation (up by 68%). In 2016 volumes of ODA for flood prevention reached \$92.0 million, while CCA contributions amounted to a significantly larger \$8.6 billion. This analysis has not examined whether contributions of CCA have been directed either less or more proportionally to the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance.


In 2016, the largest donor to these three sectors (DPP, flood prevention and CCA) combined was the UK, accounting for \$2.1 billion, or 23% of the total. This was closely followed by EU institutions (\$1.8 billion or 19%) and Germany (\$1.5 billion or 16%). The ten largest donors jointly accounted for 84% of the resources directed to DPP, flood prevention and CCA.

### What other funding is available?

A wide range of financial resources flow within crisis-affected countries, both international and domestic. Within this, official humanitarian assistance represents only a small portion of the mix. In 2016,<sup>32</sup> official humanitarian assistance for the largest 20 country recipients represented 1.7% of total reported resources available. Within the same group of recipients, government non-grant revenues made up 63% of total resources. Of the international resources flowing into these countries, the largest was commercial long-term debt, such as bonds, private bank loans and private credit from manufacturers and exporters (12.5%); ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) accounted for 6.9%.



**Figure 15 / Resource mix in the 20 countries receiving the most international humanitarian assistance, 2016**



Source: Development Initiatives calculations based on OECD DAC, FTS, CERF, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Bank and IMF data and data from peacekeeping budgets or funding snapshots.

Notes: OOFs: other official flows. Government revenue may include grants for Turkey and Yemen. Negative flows for net portfolio, short-term debt and foreign direct investment have been set to zero at the country level.

Aggregate figures conceal differences in the resource mix at country level. For example, volumes of remittances vary greatly across the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance, representing just 0.3% and 1.8% of all resources for Turkey and Iraq, while making up 26% and 37% for Pakistan and Nigeria.

Compared to the group of other developing countries,<sup>33</sup> the resource mix to the largest 20 recipients saw higher proportions of peacekeeping, non-humanitarian ODA and official humanitarian assistance flows (2.2% compared with 0.1%, 6.9% compared with 4.4% and 4.6% compared with 0.2%, respectively). While for both groups the proportion of long-term commercial debt was similar (37% for other developing countries and 34% for the largest 20 recipients), foreign direct investment made up a significantly higher proportion of the mix for other developing countries (26% compared with 12%).

## Endnotes for this chapter

1. People in need by country is calculated selecting the maximum number of people in need by cross-referencing five different databases:
    - a. primary source – ACAPS (people in need published in the most recent weekly report from 2017)
    - b. GRFC Population in Crisis (people in need gathered from *2018 Global Report on Food Crises*)
    - c. *Global Humanitarian Overview 2018* report (people in need by country);
    - d. UNHCR refugees, refugee-like situations and asylum-seekers
    - e. UNRWA total of refugees (and IDPs in Palestine).

The UNHCR and UNRWA data refers to the number of refugees (and IDPs) in hosting countries. As a result, this figure includes people in need numbers for countries beyond those with a UN-coordinated appeal and will therefore be higher than OCHA's *Humanitarian Needs Overview* estimate.
  2. See endnote 1.
  3. Figures pre-2016 are from countries with UN coordinated appeals only, and so will be lower than those for 2016–17, which also include countries that did not have an appeal.
  4. While not directly comparable with the 2016 and 2017 estimates, in 2015 UN-coordinated appeals were identifying 124.7 million people in need of assistance globally, which by the end of the year had increased to 128.6 million.
  5. Throughout the chapter, 'complex crises' refer to those which simultaneously experience at least two of the three crisis types – disasters associated with natural hazards, refugee situations or conflict. The only exception to this is in figure 12 (see note).
  6. Just three countries in 2017 experienced disasters associated with 'natural' hazards alone. In 2016 the analysis identified nine countries affected by 'natural' hazards alone, primarily driven by *El Niño*.
  7. Both reporting and methodologies for counting the numbers of conflict-driven internal displacement have improved in the current reporting period, which may have implications for the aggregate numbers used in the analysis.
  8. 'Displaced persons' refers to IDPs, refugees, asylum-seekers and people in refugee-like situations.
  9. Country income groups are based on four classifications: higher income, upper middle income, lower middle income and lower income, as defined by the World Bank based on gross national income per capita in US\$.
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10. These figures include displaced Palestinians.
11. See GHA, 2018: chapter 3 for further details.
12. Due to new functionalities introduced to FTS in 2017, analysis of funding to national and local responders is possible for 2016 and 2017, but not before that.
13. *The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016* was showing \$87.6 million going to national and local NGOs directly; these figures are not comparable to 2016 and 2017 analyses, which are based on an upgraded methodology.
14. IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, 2018. Localisation Marker Working Group: Definitions Paper, available at: [https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/hfft\\_localisation\\_marker\\_definitions\\_paper\\_24\\_january\\_2018.pdf](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/hfft_localisation_marker_definitions_paper_24_january_2018.pdf).
15. Analysis of funding through one intermediary was made possible by the new FTS flow model released at the start of 2017. It is therefore likely that more recent data is reported to a more accurate degree than that predating the new release. However, only around 22% of financing is reported beyond first-level recipients, and so this figure may contain a significant margin of error, either positive or negative.
16. The UN Secretary-General, subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly, called for the CERF to increase to \$1 billion by 2018. See UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/71/127, available at: <https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/127>. See also UN CERF, 2017. Making the case for an investment in the Central Emergency Response Fund. Available at: [www.unocha.org/cerf/sites/default/files/CERF/CERF\\_BriefingNote\\_20171108.pdf](http://www.unocha.org/cerf/sites/default/files/CERF/CERF_BriefingNote_20171108.pdf).
17. This calculation discounts two outliers: the Europe and North Korea appeals. The former has the highest requirements/person figures, while the latter has the lowest.
18. As above.
19. To calculate these averages, the Europe Situation Regional Response Plan was excluded from the analysis as an outlier, having requirements per person averaging \$2,020 and funding received per person amounting to \$1,244, above the next largest appeal in terms of both requirements and funding per person – the Syria 3RP (\$857 and \$557, respectively).
20. 2016 is the most recent year for which OECD DAC data on where humanitarian assistance goes is available. Country-allocable humanitarian assistance refers to data reported to the DAC that specifies a recipient country.

21. The methodology used to identify assistance channelled to recipients includes flows of international humanitarian assistance directed to non-ODA eligible countries.
  22. There currently does not exist a universally agreed definition of what constitutes a 'protracted crisis'.
  23. Long-term recipients are defined as those who have received an above-average share of ODA as humanitarian assistance annually for eight years or more. Medium-term recipients are those that have received such a share for between three and seven years.
  24. 'Emergency' and 'country' are not used coterminously; some emergencies are country-specific, whereas others cover more than one country but will be regarded as one country: for example the Syria emergency includes Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.
  25. 2010 was atypical in that two natural-hazard-related disasters (Haiti (23%) and Pakistan (20%)) featured among the largest five crises mobilising large volumes of international humanitarian assistance.
  26. The analysis uses country-allocable only international humanitarian assistance figures and therefore totals will differ from aggregates calculated by donor or emergency in other analyses.
  27. The regional and/or refugee response plans with a focus on displacement tend not to provide disaggregated data by sector, and so much of the reporting captures figures across the overall appeal.
  28. Developments to UN OCHA's FTS functionalities will make it easier to track Cash Transfers Programming (CTP) and provide greater granularity on CTP data in 2018.
  29. This figure is from CaLP and Accenture Development Partnerships (2018). The methodology builds on research by Development Initiatives in 2016 for ODI (Spencer, Parrish and Lattimer, 2016)
  30. This is the percentage of flows on FTS with the modality cash-transfer programming out of total international humanitarian assistance the respective countries reported to FTS in 2017.
  31. Official humanitarian assistance refers to assistance given by DAC donors and reported to OECD DAC. International humanitarian assistance comprises funding from non-DAC donors as well (see chapter on components, methods and approach).
  32. 2016 is the most recent year for which data is available.
  33. 'Developing countries' refers to the World Bank's classification.
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