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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The State of the Humanitarian System project aims to provide a longitudinal assessment of the size, shape and performance of the humanitarian system. It reports every three years. This is the fourth report, covering the period 2015–17. It is based on the same broad structure, methodology and questions as the previous editions, to allow an assessment of progress over time.

Composition of the humanitarian system

In 2017, the total combined field personnel of the humanitarian sector numbered approximately 570,000. This represents an increase of 27% from the last SOHS report (450,000 in 2013). Growing numbers of national humanitarian workers appeared to drive this increase, while the number of international (expatriate) staff remained stable. On average across humanitarian organisations, this growth in personnel did not keep pace with the overall rise in operational expenditure.

The majority of funding continued to flow through UN agencies, with the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) the three largest in terms of expenditure. Much of this funding was then passed on as grants to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These three agencies were also among the largest in terms of staffing, although for the first time they were outstripped in staff numbers by an NGO (Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)). As in 2015, UN agencies and NGOs spent similar amounts overall (\$16 billion for the UN and \$16.8 billion for NGOs). Expenditure by the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement fell in proportion to both UN organisations and NGOs as a result of reduced expenditure by National Societies. The concentration of funding flowing through a small number of international NGOs evident in previous editions of *The State of the Humanitarian System* continued, though it was less marked than in the past: in 2017, 23% of funding went through six large international NGOs, compared to 31% through five in the previous edition of the SOHS.

Table 1 / Organisational resources devoted to humanitarian aid

	UN agencies*	NGOs (estimates)	Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement**
Field personnel	79,000	331,000	159,700
569,700	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 68,000 nationals • 11,000 internationals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 304,000 nationals • 27,000 internationals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14,000 ICRC/IFRC, nationals • 2,700 ICRC/IFRC, internationals • 143,000 RCS, nationals
Humanitarian expenditure (not cumulative)***	\$16 billion	\$16.8 billion	\$15.7 billion

All figures are for the 2017 calendar year, apart from National Red Cross/Crescent Societies, where the most recent data is from 2016.

* Includes UN agency members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), plus the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

** Includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies in non-high-income countries.

*** Figures for humanitarian expenditures cannot be totalled across provider types as this would result in double counting because UN agencies programme large portions of their humanitarian spend through NGOs.



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Humanitarian needs and funding

Over 2015–17, humanitarian need was driven by protracted large-scale conflicts, primarily in Yemen, Syria and South Sudan. An estimated 201 million people needed international humanitarian assistance in 2017, the highest estimate to date.¹ Most countries requiring international assistance were affected by multiple crisis types, with many conflict-affected countries also hosting refugees or experiencing disasters associated with natural hazards. The number of people forcibly displaced by conflict and violence increased over the period, reaching 68.5 million in 2017; close to two-thirds of these people were internally displaced.

A small number of complex crises continued to receive the majority of funding, sustaining a growing trend from 2014 – 58% of international humanitarian assistance was directed to just five crises in 2017, a 5% increase on 2014. This increasing concentration of allocations was accompanied by a gradual shift from recipients primarily in the South of Sahara region to the Middle East and North of Sahara. Syria was the single largest emergency in all three years of the 2015–17 period, receiving 28% of international humanitarian assistance in 2017.

International humanitarian assistance continued to grow, reaching its peak to date at \$27.3 billion in 2017. However, after a significant increase (16%) in 2014–15, growth slowed to 3% per year for 2016 and 2017. A small number of donor governments continued to contribute the majority of international humanitarian assistance over 2015–17. The three largest donors accounted for 59% of all government contributions in 2017, compared to 56% in 2014.

While overall humanitarian contributions grew, the shortfall between requirements and contributions to UN-coordinated appeals also increased. The amount requested through UN appeals stood at \$25.2 billion in 2017, the highest ever requested, exceeding the total 2014 volumes by \$4.9 billion. Funding to the appeals, while increasing to \$14.9 billion in 2017, 19% higher than 2014, left a gap of \$10.3 billion, again the largest to date.

The increase in the number of people displaced by conflict and violence was reflected in how funding was spent. Assistance to refugees is predominantly reported under the ‘multi-sector’ code, under which the largest amount of funding was both requested and received over 2015–17. Although the level of ‘Multi-sector’ funding grew, the shortfall against the level requested (i.e. coverage) also increased: in 2017, only 51% of the amount requested was received. Of sector-specific assistance, food security remained the largest in terms of volumes requested and received, with coverage of 61% in 2017, against 53% in 2015. Detail beyond broad sectoral categories remains difficult to gather. The same data availability challenges also hold with regard to quantifying volumes directed to disaster preparedness and prevention (DPP). Of the data reported to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), humanitarian assistance for DPP amounted to \$0.7 billion in 2016, almost 4% below 2015 volumes.

Humanitarian assistance reaches people in need through multiple channels, following long transaction chains. In 2016, \$12.3 billion or 60% of all direct government funding went to multilateral organisations in the first instance. NGOs received \$4 billion directly – 20% of the total. This configuration is broadly in line with the previous reporting period. There was a slight increase in direct funding to national and local NGOs, from 1.7% of all NGO funding in 2016 to 2.7% in 2017. However, local and national NGOs received just 0.4% directly of all international humanitarian assistance reported to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) in 2017, a rise of just 0.1% from 2016. The majority of international humanitarian assistance to NGOs continues to go to international organisations, which received 94% of total NGO funding in 2017, up from 85% in 2016. Improved reporting may in part explain the changes seen in 2017, with a decrease in levels of ‘undefined’ funding.

Flexible funding volumes through pooled funds continued to grow, reaching a record \$1.3 billion in 2017, 53% higher than 2014. Within this, funding for both the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the 18 country-based pooled funds grew by 27% and 76% respectively over the same period. Cash transfers also grew, reaching an estimated \$2.8 billion in 2016, a 40% increase on 2015 levels.

International resources in crisis contexts beyond humanitarian assistance remained limited. For example, levels of foreign direct investment and remittances are lower for the largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance compared to the group of other developing countries. Some



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financial sources and instruments in crisis settings evolved and became more prominent over the period, notably from initiatives from international financial institutions and Islamic social giving. While not new in themselves, these sources received increasing attention given their potential to broaden the ‘traditional’ resource base of humanitarian assistance.

New funding instruments were developed primarily in response either to disasters associated with natural hazards or in relation to displacement: examples being trialled in crisis settings include Forecast-based Financing (FbF), the European Investment Bank (EIB)’s Economic Resilience Initiative and the Humanitarian Impact Bond (HIB). The World Bank trialled new types of instruments over the study period, with both sovereign and non-sovereign partners. Challenges remain not only in quantifying the volumes of assistance available from the Bank and other international financial institutions, but also in making this information available in a speedier manner to inform a more comprehensive and coordinated financial response.

Performance of the humanitarian system

The period 2015–17 was marked by important and rapid changes in the geopolitical landscape. Most – although not all – of these changes were negative, in that they increased needs and made responses more difficult. At the same time, the humanitarian system itself – despite calls for transformational change – continued along a path of incremental improvement in some areas, and a lack of movement in others.

Globally, the most notable features of the period from a humanitarian perspective were a rise in populist political movements and an increase in the number and political visibility of refugees, asylum-seekers and other irregular migrants attempting to enter high-income countries. In many cases, the two phenomena were related: populist politicians in a number of states built support by mixing concerns about immigration into their nationalist rhetoric.

This political shift away from a more internationalist, liberal worldview was particularly marked in a number of states that are important humanitarian donors, and that have, traditionally, provided political and financial support to international humanitarian action. This shift appears to have affected the global environment in which humanitarians work. Many experts interviewed for this edition of *The State of the Humanitarian System* gave examples of countries that were traditionally strong supporters of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law failing to challenge abuses, and in some cases even acting against the spirit and letter of the law. There are strong suggestions that this has emboldened some refugee-hosting governments and governments engaged in internal conflict to conduct abuses against civilians, ignore their obligations to refugees or obstruct access to humanitarian agencies. These changes account, in part, for the continued decline in performance in the areas of coverage (the ability to reach everyone in need) and coherence (the ability to conduct operations in line with international humanitarian and refugee law) outlined in this report.

At the same time, the increased political visibility of asylum-seekers and irregular migrants drew attention to poverty and insecurity in the countries that these people were leaving. This contributed to increased ‘developmental’ funding – through the World Bank and a series of bilateral compacts – for fragile and conflict-affected states, and for states hosting refugees. Humanitarian actors have, for many years, called for greater engagement by development actors in these contexts. It remains to be seen how the humanitarian system will accommodate itself to these changes now that these calls have, to a degree, been answered.

The European Migration ‘Crisis’ also challenged the traditional model of humanitarian action, which was largely developed in response to famines in states with little machinery of governance. The people entering Europe had a broad range of humanitarian needs – from the preservation of life while crossing the Mediterranean to help dealing with bureaucracies when they arrived in Europe. These needs occurred in, or off the shores of, some of the richest countries in the world. Not for the first time, humanitarian agencies were forced to consider their role in a context to which they were unaccustomed, and where the traditional model did not apply. A similar challenge faced the humanitarian system in its response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa. Originally seen by the United Nations and other international and regional bodies purely as a ‘health crisis’ (and so outside the ambit of most humanitarian organisations), it was eventually addressed in a more holistic and effective manner. Humanitarian organisations played an important role in this, but time was lost while they attempted to clarify their role and deploy human and other resources.

Large-scale migration into Europe and the Ebola Epidemic both underline the degree to which transport and communications technology have built stronger connections between different parts of the world and eroded the distance between the rich world of traditional donors and the poor world of traditional recipients of resources and venues of operations. Both were also, very largely, urban responses (as is much humanitarian work in Syria, Iraq and the Middle East more widely), taking place against new backgrounds of constraint and opportunity. The period 2015–17 showed that the system can adapt to these (still) unfamiliar situations, but it cannot yet do so quickly or reliably.

In response to these and other trends, a number of new operational actors emerged in 2015–17. In Europe, there was a growth in civil society groups responding to the needs of migrants. In Nepal, NGOs from China and India became involved on a significant scale in disaster relief activities outside their own countries. Chinese NGOs in particular can be expected to take on an increased role in humanitarian action over the coming years as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Within the humanitarian system, the period saw a large number of initiatives aimed at improving humanitarian action. Many were reflected in, and given further impetus by, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit



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(WHS). In particular, there was increased attention and institutional support for the ‘localisation’ of humanitarian action (supporting the governments and civil societies of crisis-affected states to play the lead role in humanitarian response); for improving the links between humanitarian and development programming; and for the provision of cash, rather than relief goods, to people affected by crisis. Recognising the continued pressure on humanitarian resources, donors and a group of the larger operational agencies also agreed a ‘Grand Bargain’ aimed at creating efficiencies and freeing up funding: donors agreed to make funds more flexible and reporting less onerous, while agencies agreed to greater transparency over how funds were spent.

At the end of 2017, discussions on how to implement many of these ideas were still taking place at the policy level: in the headquarters of donor organisations and humanitarian agencies. While many people had hoped that the WHS would catalyse a rapid and radical transformation to ‘fix’ a ‘broken’ system, actual changes appear to have been evolutionary and incremental – in fact, the process appears to have been most successful in giving impetus to changes and improvements already under way. As a result, progress on the ground has – to date – been modest in many areas; improvements appear to be moving more rapidly within individual agencies than they are in inter-agency contexts and in the system as a whole, and the tendency (noted in the SOHS 2012 report) to focus on specific changes to the process of aid delivery, rather than on the outcomes of humanitarian action (saving lives; securing livelihoods; protecting people from abuses) is still very evident.

A number of areas where improvement is needed, many of which were noted in the 2012 and 2015 editions of the SOHS, are still largely overlooked. These include: collection of information in a number of key areas, including information on mortality and on the longer-term impacts of aid; monitoring, particularly monitoring of the outcomes of humanitarian interventions; ensuring staff have the skills for humanitarian responses; incorporating the views and feedback of crisis-affected people into programme design; making programmes more context-specific and more adaptable to changes in context; and preventing abuse and exploitation in humanitarian programmes (although this was an area of renewed interest in early 2018).

Nevertheless, this edition of *The State of the Humanitarian System* does point to changes on the ground. Relations between international actors and the governments of affected states continue the trend of improvement seen in the last two editions of the report. While less has been achieved in handing over power and resources to local civil society organisations, the case studies and surveys for this report suggest that some small steps have been made. More programmes include elements of ‘resilience’ and attempt to address both immediate needs and the drivers of need than was the case in 2015. There appear to have been some limited improvements in the relevance and efficiency of aid.

Most importantly, the report identifies improvements in the quality, timeliness and effectiveness of humanitarian aid. The 2015 report concluded that there had been improvements in rapid responses to sudden-onset disasters: essentially, that the humanitarian system had become more effective in saving lives in the aftermath of hurricanes, earthquakes and large refugee movements. These improvements seem to have been maintained in 2015–17. The same report identified responses to slow-onset disasters (notably food insecurity related to drought and conflict) as ‘abjectly slow’. In the period since 2015, the system appears to have become faster and more effective in identifying and meeting the life-saving needs of people in this type of situation, and in situations where people are dispersed and not living in camps – as demonstrated by activities in Somalia, Kenya and – to a lesser extent – South Sudan. However, these improvements, while significant, are neither sufficient nor universal. Even in these areas of relative success, mortality was still high, and in some situations – notably in Kasai in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – responses were still very slow.

Improvements in the provision of immediate assistance have not been mirrored by improvements in meeting longer-term needs in protracted crises: there may be more humanitarian programmes addressing this area, but they do not seem to be particularly successful. At the same time – as noted above – development actors are becoming more engaged in addressing chronic needs in fragile states, and this may lead to improvements before the next edition of the SOHS. The system has also not improved in its ability to meet protection needs: performance here remains very mixed, with examples both of success and of failure. Similarly, in the area of advocacy and negotiation there are some examples of success – often at an operational level – but the conclusion of the 2015 report still holds: advocacy efforts are often unsuccessful because they ‘lack a strategic and unified approach’.

In short, the period 2015–17 has seen progress – some of it fairly unheralded, but nevertheless important. But this progress has been slower and less transformational than many would have hoped. There are a number of reasons for this. Most systems resist change – there are many incentives to preserve the status quo. It may be unrealistic to expect a system as diverse as this to fundamentally change in one or two years, and even if fully committed to change, many of the most important levers for improvement lie outside the control of humanitarians themselves: they have limited influence over the amount of money the system receives; over many aspects of how it is spent; over the budgetary priorities of crisis-affected governments; and over the behaviour of combatants in conflicts. But the research for this report also suggests that there are some areas where improvements could be made if humanitarians were prepared to reconsider their attitudes and ways of working.

The first of these areas is **coverage** – ensuring that everyone in need is able to access humanitarian assistance. This element of humanitarian performance has got steadily worse since 2012, and is currently far short

of adequate. As noted above, much of the blame for this lies at the door of governments and non-state armed groups. However, at least part of the problem lies in the attitudes and behaviours of (many) humanitarian organisations themselves: overly risk-averse and insufficiently prepared to move rapidly from one location to another.

The second area where improvement is required is around **collective action**. The system currently demonstrates a lack of effective methods, structures and (often) desire to collaborate. In many areas – accountability, protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA), innovation, procurement, working with civil society and many more – some individual agencies have made significant advances. But these advances have not led to improvements at the level of the system as a whole, which is, as a result, consistently less than the sum of its parts. The nature of the humanitarian system makes working together difficult: there is no overall authority, and so no effective way of compelling organisations to collaborate. In addition, the organisations that make up the system are competing with one another, and may not wish to collaborate. Previous editions of the SOHS have reported on improvements in coordination at the level of individual countries, but the impression remains that, if the humanitarian system is to make major improvements, it needs to fundamentally reassess how it can address this challenge of collective action at all levels.






A third area is **understanding of, and ability to adapt to, context**. The humanitarian system still operates, very largely, according to a standard set of activities, structures and procedures. This approach is effective, and has many benefits where the standard set is being used to address the situations for which it was designed. However, as noted above, in the last three years there has been an increase in non-standard emergencies: in urban contexts, in middle- and high-income countries, in response to new and unexpected crises. The model also fails to take into account the capacities of the state and of civil society affected by crises, and so allow the system to ‘fill gaps’ and work in support of mechanisms that are already in place.

None of these problems are new: they have been pointed out extensively in research, including previous editions of *The State of the Humanitarian System*. All of them are pressing, all relate directly to the core humanitarian concern of saving human life and none can be addressed by pushing only for changes in one process or approach. If the humanitarian system wants to keep pace with changes in its environment, any one of these three areas would be a good place to start.



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Table 2 / Progress against SOHS performance criteria by study period

	SOHS 2018 (compared to SOHS 2015)	
Sufficiency		No progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite increased funding, the system still does not have sufficient resources to cover needs. This is a result of growing numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance and also, potentially, of increased ambition on the part of the humanitarian sector.
Coverage		Decline <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor coverage of internally displaced people (IDPs) outside camps identified in the 2015 report has not been effectively addressed. Concerns about addressing the needs of people and communities hosting refugees have increased. The ability of people to access humanitarian assistance in situations of conflict has got worse, with governments and non-state armed groups increasingly denying access or using bureaucracy to hinder access. Humanitarian coverage has been poor for large numbers of irregular migrants.
Relevance & appropriateness		Limited progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Humanitarian aid comprises a basic package of life-saving assistance, which is seen as relevant in many situations. Priority protection needs are often not met, although there has been increased focus on this area in country strategies over the period. Needs beyond the acute, immediate response 'package' are often not understood and generally not met. The specific needs of the elderly and people with disabilities are often not met, but the system has taken limited steps to better meet the specific needs of women and girls. Multi-purpose cash grants can go some way to increasing the relevance of aid.
Accountability & participation		Limited progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The main challenge identified in the 2015 report – that feedback mechanisms are in place, but do not influence decision-making – has not been addressed. While there are a number of initiatives and approaches that show potential, they have not yet delivered greater accountability or participation. Many interviewees are concerned that AAP is becoming a 'box-ticking exercise'.
Effectiveness		Improvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness in meeting immediate life-saving needs in 'natural' disasters and in responding to sudden movements of refugees has been maintained, although agencies have found it hard to identify their role and objectives in the European Migration 'Crisis'. Effectiveness – including timeliness – improved in responding to food insecurity in complex emergencies. The system is still not effective in meeting protection needs overall, but there are more examples of specific programmes meeting (often quite limited) protection objectives. Do no harm approaches appear to be more commonly used. The quality of responses appears to have improved.



**No
progress**



**Limited
progress**



Improvement



Decline



**Mixed
progress**











SOHS 2015 (compared to SOHS 2012)		
Sufficiency & coverage		Decline <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite an increase in funding, overall coverage decreased. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most gaps were seen in support for chronic crises, including deficits in funding, technical capacity, and recruitment, as well as access constraints. Some coverage improvements were cited in responses to natural disasters. Perceptions of sufficiency among humanitarian actors surveyed dropped to 24% (from 34% in 2012). More pessimism was expressed about ability to reach people in need in conflicts, mostly due to insecurity.
Relevance & appropriateness		No progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A slight majority (51%) said needs assessment had improved but saw no progress in engaging local participation. Some methodological innovations occurred in needs assessment, but no consensus was reached on tools. More feedback mechanisms were developed, but there is little evidence of affected populations' input to project design or approach.
Effectiveness		Mixed progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improvements were noted in both timeliness and mortality/morbidity outcomes in rapid responses to major natural disasters. Improvements were noted in coordination, and in quality of leadership and personnel in major emergencies. Performance was poor in conflict settings. A majority of survey respondents graded effectiveness low. Cross-cutting issues have not yet been systematically addressed. Most progress has been in the area of gender, but more needs to be done in the areas of age and disability.

Table 2 / Progress against SOHS performance criteria by study period (cont.)

	SOHS 2018 (compared to SOHS 2015)	
Efficiency		Limited progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The main constraints to efficiency identified in the 2015 report – particularly non-harmonised reporting and ‘pass through’ arrangements for funding – have not been addressed. • Increased work on early response – and particularly the use of social safety nets – has prevented inefficient ‘peak of crisis’ response in some areas. • Some improvements have been made in joint procurement and supply chains within the UN. • Increased use of cash has increased efficiency in many (but not all) areas. • The ‘Grand Bargain’ process, initiated during the study period, aims to address a number of areas related to efficiency.
Coherence		Decline <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The increased integration of humanitarian action into development and stabilisation agendas has made coherence with humanitarian principles more difficult for operational agencies. • Humanitarians are operating in a context of declining respect for IHL and refugee law.
Connectedness		Improvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes in policy and increases in funding have led to closer connections between humanitarian and development activities, often in the form of ‘resilience’ work. • There is some evidence that this has been effective at protecting against future shocks where the work has been done with governments, and where it addresses foreseeable ‘natural’ disasters (droughts, earthquakes). • There is much less evidence that this work is effective in other circumstances. • There has been a significant increase in interest among donors in fragile states and refugee-hosting states. • Development financing is increasingly available for the provision of services in countries experiencing conflict. • Donors are supporting more ‘developmental’ approaches to refugee situations. • Donors are also supporting work in ‘stabilisation’ and peace-building: many humanitarian agencies are not engaged, or do not wish to engage, with this work.
Complementarity²		Improvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relations with the governments of crisis-affected states are improving in many cases, although there is still a tendency to push governments aside in rapid-onset, ‘surge’ situations. • Relations with governments are often more difficult where the state is a party to internal armed conflict or in refugee contexts. There has been an increase in governments using bureaucratic obstacles to hinder the provision of impartial humanitarian assistance. • There has been significant activity at policy level in strengthening the role of national and local NGOs in the international humanitarian system, but, to date, this has had limited effect on the ground.
Impact		Insufficient information to draw a conclusion

SOHS 2015 (compared to SOHS 2012)		
Efficiency		Limited progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No significant change or new development was noted since the last review. • A few small-scale (project-level) examples of new efficiencies were noted. • Some inefficiencies were cited in surge response to Typhoon Haiyan and in the Syrian Refugee Response.
Coherence		No progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stabilisation and counter-terror agendas continued to influence donors' humanitarian funding decisions. • Donor firewalling of humanitarian aid, and their consideration of principles, has weakened. • There is a perception of increasing instrumentalisation and politicisation of humanitarian assistance, including by affected states. • Despite the rise of the resilience concept, no progress occurred in changing aid architecture to suit, or in phasing in development resources earlier in the response and recovery phases.
Connectedness		Limited progress <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited progress in Asia was outweighed by lack of progress in many other regions. • Survey participants saw little participation and consultation of local authorities. • Consultation and participation of recipients ranked poorest among practitioners.

Endnotes for this chapter

1. People in need by country is calculated selecting the maximum number of people in need by cross-referencing five different databases:
 - a. primary source – ACAPS (people in need published in the most recent weekly report from 2017)
 - b. GRFC Population in Crisis (people in need gathered from *2018 Global Report on Food Crises*)
 - c. *Global Humanitarian Overview 2018* report (people in need by country); d. UNHCR refugees, refugee-like situations and asylum-seekers
 - e. UNRWA total of refugees (and IDPs in Palestine).

The UNHCR and UNRWA data refers to the number of refugees (and IDPs) in hosting countries. As a result, this figure includes people in need numbers for countries beyond those with a UN-coordinated appeal and will therefore be higher than OCHA's *Humanitarian Needs Overview* estimate.
2. This criterion was not looked at separately in previous reports. The improvement is based on comparison with information that was previously under other categories.