Increases and changes in refugee populations

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the world’s refugee population has continued to grow, from an estimated 25.4 million people in 2017 to 27.1 million in 2021. But rates of displacement slowed over these four years compared to the previous period, with COVID-19 restricting movement and fewer people fleeing from Syria, Myanmar and South Sudan. Those who had already fled remained without long-term solutions: many Syrians entered their tenth year of displacement, and Rohingya refugees faced a fifth year living in temporary shelter. Since the previous edition of the SOHS charted the European migration ‘crisis’ and the subsequent 2016 deal between the European Union and Turkey, the situation continued to change character: although large numbers of refugees and migrants remained in Greece, pockets of acute need in Europe became mobile and fragmented.238 The war in Ukraine has radically altered this picture. In the first six months of 2022, over 5.2 million people from Ukraine had fled across Europe,239 creating one of the largest refugee populations in the world.

Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic limited cross-border movement and affected refugees directly and indirectly. Initial fears of major outbreaks in congested camps were largely not realised, and most host countries included refugees and people seeking asylum in their national vaccination plans. However, given that 85% of refugees were hosted in developing countries,240 they were affected by the global inequity in vaccine distribution. Already living in precarious conditions, many were highly vulnerable to the economic impacts of the pandemic – hit hard by inflation shocks and losing livelihoods and accommodation.241 The effects were also felt in camps: in Bangladesh, lockdown measures exacerbated already high levels of gender-based violence in refugee households, while restrictions imposed in the name of COVID-19 control have curtailed basic services and cut off access to safe spaces.242

New global agreements

In December 2018, the UN General Assembly affirmed the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). Marking the end of a two-year process and building on the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework243 (CRRF), the GCR aimed to transform how the international community and host governments work together towards more equitable and predictable responsibility-sharing.244 

To build momentum for implementation, the first four-yearly Global Refugee Forum (GRF) was held in 2019, organised by UNHCR and six states.245 The conference saw 1,400 pledges made, but as a non-binding framework it will be difficult to ensure that these are honoured and compel non-engaged actors to abide by the GCR’s principles. Initial progress reports in 2021246suggested that, while the GCR had had positive effects, it had not been transformative for the global refugee response.  

Global uptake of the GCR was uneven, with major refugee-hosting countries showing very different levels of engagement. Uganda, then host to the world’s third-largest refugee population, was an early adopter of the CRRF, integrating its principles into national development strategies. In Bangladesh, by contrast, the GCR was absent in national frameworks as the government does not recognise the Rohingya population as refugees and allows only temporary support, with a view to repatriation to Myanmar. Donor countries, prioritising migration management, tended to focus on their international, rather than domestic, GCR responsibilities, and so risked undermining it by being ‘constructive abroad but obstructive at home’,247 including through hostile policies and moves to outsource asylum processes to other countries. This has a dual negative effect: limiting the protection space within these countries’ borders and weakening support for protection norms overseas.

Donor countries, prioritising migration management, tended to focus on their international, rather than domestic, GCR responsibilities, and so risked undermining it by being ‘constructive abroad but obstructive at home’.

The responsibility-sharing model of the GCR involved commitment to a new level of sustained, equitable and predictable funding. However, this remained at the discretion of donors.248 Financial pledges at the 2019 GRF amounted to an estimated $2 billion,249 but it is unclear how much of this was new, additional funding or restated commitments.250 It is also unclear how much has been disbursed.251 There has, however, been a clear increase in engagement from the World Bank Group in refugee financing: the 2016 introduction of a funding window for refugees was followed by a commitment to investment of $2.2 billion, including a $1 billion sub-window to address COVID-19 impacts. 252 The composition of the instrument recognised the importance of sustained political and financial engagement to enable longer-term opportunities for refugees and their hosts. 

The GCR is framed around the accepted durable solutions – local integration, resettlement to a third country or safe return - yet the reality for many refugees remained protracted existence in temporary conditions.253 There have been some promising commitments on local integration, with host countries making over 280 pledges on laws and policy. An evaluation of the 15 contexts which were applying the CRRF found that progress had been made at the policy level – albeit ‘tempered’ in implementation.254 On resettlement, a three-year strategy developed under the auspices of the GCR aimed to see 70,000 refugees resettled through UNHCR alone. However, the COVID-19 pandemic meant the suspension of resettlement for several months, making 2020 the lowest resettlement year in almost two decades.255 The rate of refugees returning to their home countries also fell in 2020, largely due to the pandemic, beginning to increase again in the first half of 2021. But safe and dignified repatriation remained unfeasible for most refugees, even if it was the preference of host states, and humanitarian organisations feared that the global durable solutions discussion could be skewed by political interests in favour of rapid return, which may be inappropriate, unsafe and involuntary.256, 257 

Humanitarian performance

Compared to other aid recipients, refugees were generally less satisfied with the relevance and volume of aid they received. According to our survey, refugees were 30% less likely than other aid recipients to fully agree that aid addressed their priority needs and 60% less likely to express satisfaction with the amount of aid they received. They were, however, more positive than other aid recipients about having their views heard: overall, refugees were 40% more likely to say that they had been consulted and 210% more likely to say that they had had opportunities to provide feedback. These findings reflect the system’s limitations in protracted and often politically constrained settings; agencies are able to establish the longer-term presence and basic mechanisms for engaging with refugees, but they often lack the adaptive latitude or financing to meet their complex needs over time. 

Agencies are able to establish the longer-term presence and basic mechanisms for engaging with refugees, but they often lack the adaptive latitude or financing to meet their complex needs over time.

This fits with evidence that the humanitarian system tends to be more effective at meeting the immediate material life-saving needs of refugees, but less able to meet their longer-term needs. In response to the Rohingya refugee crisis, for example, the system performed well against basic life-saving metrics, particularly given the scale and rapidity of the refugee influx and the risk-prone location of the crisis:258 mortality was kept below emergency thresholds for most of the first year and morbidity and malnutrition declined.259 However, in Bangladesh and in other contexts, efforts to address the effects of protracted displacement were constrained by agency mandates, the national policy environment and limited options for meaningful durable solutions, in particular return to Myanmar. Even so, aid workers felt there was scope for improvement and that the humanitarian community could advocate more strongly for long-term solutions. 

Balancing support for refugees and host communities has been a challenge. In many contexts, refugees are hosted in already marginalised and deprived areas, and assisting the local population is important for both actual and perceived fairness. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, proportion-based targets for assisting refugees and locals have risked diverting funds from the most vulnerable and masking the complexity and diversity of both refugee and host community needs.260 It can also mean that certain groups are missed. In Lebanon, for example, donor requirements and government-led proportional targets for supporting Syrian refugees and host populations meant that the needs of large numbers of Iraqi and Palestinian refugees were often overlooked.261 Policies on host community inclusion have however played an important role in promoting social cohesion and addressing the acute needs of local populations. This is evident in programming in Tanzania and Uganda, and in some COVID-19 response programming in Bangladesh.262 But social cohesion effects can be hard to measure and sustain as tensions can be both deep-seated and volatile, especially when countries face additional economic and social shocks.263 

Despite the IASC commitment to the centrality of protection nearly a decade ago, evaluations have noted less success with regard to protection relative to other areas of refugee assistance.264, 265 There are external barriers to success, including restrictive policy environments. UNHCR has been able to win small mitigating gains in the face of protection threats to Rohingya refugees,266 but the scope for wider influence remains limited. Even for forms of protection that are possible and available, refugees’ status-related fears can inhibit impact: one examination of low uptake of referrals relating to sexual and gender-based violence found that, alongside other stigmas and concerns, reluctance to approach officials or to breach travel restrictions for fear of deportation was a factor for those with unclear or precarious residency status.267 The needs of displaced LGBTQI people and their associated protection risks are generally not adequately taken into account or served by the humanitarian system.268 

Confusion and fragmentation within the humanitarian system have also stymied effectiveness. This is a global problem,269 and one which recurs in multiple country evaluations. In Djibouti, there was a notable lack of clarity and unity between agencies on priorities, approaches and roles for identifying and addressing protection concerns.270 In Bangladesh, evaluations of the initial phase of the Rohingya response found that the government ban on UNHCR registrations, combined with the lack of protection leadership from other responders, meant that ‘the initial response lacked a protection framework as its main lens’.271 Four years on from the start of the current crisis, field interviewees reported that protection was still ‘side-lined’ and the complicated coordination structure made advocacy and information sharing particularly challenging. Effectiveness has not been improved by the implication of some humanitarian agencies in protection-related concerns, namely the 2021 revelation that refugees’ personal data had been shared with the Myanmar authorities.272

Lebanon case study: Protracted refugee populations in a worsening host country situation

Author: Local researcher, Lebanon.  Name withheld to protect the author’s identity.

Lebanon continued to host the largest number of refugees relative to the size of its population, including an estimated 1.5 million Syrians and more than 250,000 Palestinians.273 The country also faced political volatility and a major port explosion in Beirut in 2020. Severe economic decline, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, is estimated to have pushed over 55% of the population below the poverty line.274 Between 2019 and 2021, food prices increased by 400%.

A more precarious situation for refugees 

As the Syrian refugee crisis moves into its tenth year, the affected population and the agencies that assist them highlighted three persistent challenges. First, lack of legal status: in 2015, the government instructed UNHCR to stop registering Syrian refugees,275 leaving a third of the current population with no legal status and without freedom of movement or the right to work. Those with legal status had to renew their documents regularly but registration rates declined, exacerbated by COVID-19 closures and financial barriers.276 This contributes to the second challenge: a lack of access to income and food. With 90% of Syrian refugee households living in extreme poverty, the majority resorted to negative coping strategies: 90% reported taking on debt, primarily to buy food, while others reported begging and not sending children to school. Third, poverty combined with a privatised and overstretched health system meant that refugees were unable to access and pay for basic healthcare.277

Greater pressure on the humanitarian response 

The financial data supports what both affected populations and delivery agencies reported: that needs were outstripping the supply of support. The 2021 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) targeted more than double the number of people for basic assistance between 2019 and 2022, but its budget increased only minimally,278, 279 despite rising fuel and commodity prices increasing the cost of project implementation, and a six-fold rise in the cost of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket). Funds have not met more than 54% of initial annual requirements since 2013.  

Cash and voucher programmes were an established core of humanitarian assistance in Lebanon (in 2021, $165.8 million was provided via cash assistance programmes).280  But the financial crisis in Lebanon had required agencies to think twice about how they provided cash: in 2020, only half of cash-assisted severely vulnerable households reported being able to meet their minimum needs. Cash transfers shifted from the plummeting Lebanese pound281, 282 towards ‘dollarisation’ of transfers,283 and following humanitarian agencies’ advocacy, the transfer value of the main cash programme was doubled in late 2021.284 Yet there were also concerns about the negative consequences of these measures.285 Amid fears of further fuelling community tensions, some agencies chose to maintain wide coverage rather than increase payments to those most in need. The economic decline worsened community tensions, leading to a distrust of aid targeting decisions, and a prevalent sense that vulnerable Lebanese had been neglected by the international system.286 As a result, refugees reported feeling scared and humiliated when they went to receive assistance and withdraw cash payments.

A whole-of-society approach

The GCR advocates a ‘whole-of-society approach’, whereby refugees are integrated into host communities and are able to access the same benefits from development investments, while humanitarian assistance supports existing services to meet acute needs. Lebanon is heralded as an example of this approach, and development actors interviewed for this study praised its ‘inclusive approach’ to working with Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis. 

However, there was a prevalent concern that focusing on the ‘whole of society’ leaves those most vulnerable behind as funds are spent on systemic improvements to Lebanon’s infrastructure, rather than projects targeted at refugees. For example, interviewees working in the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector described how resources and funds had been diverted away from simple and effective projects that would adequately support those most in need. Instead, funding was being spent on large-scale projects without attention to the policy environment, infrastructure or resources that would enable them to benefit the most vulnerable. At the same time, for refugees, funding gaps and restrictions on long-term programming mean that meaningful resilience building remains unrealised. As one INGO worker put it: ‘There’s been lots of discussions about the nexus with development in the humanitarian sphere. We’ve had a lot of such discussions in Lebanon, but can we really talk about moving to durable solutions for refugees given the current context in Lebanon? The context has been very difficult.’

Box C: Internal displacement

Barbara Essig, IDMC

At the end of 2021, an estimated 59.1 million people287 were internally displaced – the highest figure to date and more than double the number 10 years ago. As seen in Chapter 1, after remaining relatively stable between 2015 and 2018, IDP numbers increased significantly, with 17.8 million more in 2021 than in 2018.288

While disasters continue to displace more people than conflict and violence – 23.6 million compared to 14.4 million respectively in 2021 – and with many people forced to flee more than once, 2021 saw above-average displacement triggered by conflict and violence. While disaster displacement fluctuates due to the cyclical nature of many natural hazards, new displacements due to conflict and violence were the highest in a decade. More than 80% of all conflict displacements in 2021 took place in sub-Saharan Africa, with displacements in Ethiopia alone accounting for 5.1 million, the highest number for a single country since data has been available.

While disaster displacement fluctuates due to the cyclical nature of many natural hazards, new displacements due to conflict and violence were the highest in a decade.

Climate change can be an additional aggravating factor and risk multiplier for displacement, increasing the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events289 and causing slow-onset effects such as temperature- and sea-level rise and desertification, which interact with other political or socioeconomic drivers. As a result, multiple risk factors are converging; in 2020, 95% of all new internal displacement triggered by conflict and violence was in countries vulnerable or highly vulnerable to climate change.290

In 2020, 95% of all new internal displacement triggered by conflict and violence was in countries vulnerable or highly vulnerable to climate change.

The protracted nature of many existing IDP situations, with people being uprooted for years or even decades, means that internal displacement is not just a humanitarian issue. It affects the displaced population and host community alike, and touches on all areas of life, including housing and livelihoods, healthcare and education and security and personal safety.291 In the absence of strategic long-term investments to address the risks and vulnerabilities of displacement and find long-term solutions, recurrent humanitarian costs continued to grow. For 2021 alone, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that the global cost of internal displacement stood at almost $1 billion.292

After being largely absent from both the GCR and the GCM, internal displacement has regained political and policy visibility through the work of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement. In the face of steadily rising IDP numbers, the Secretary-General tasked the Panel with finding ‘innovative and concrete solutions for IDPs and tangible solutions on the ground’. The panel’s final report, released in September 2021, stresses the need for an effective nexus approach that brings together the humanitarian and development communities, but also peacebuilding, climate change and disaster risk reduction experts.293 How this will be implemented – including through the UN Secretary-General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement and the newly appointed Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement – remains to be seen. Explicitly tasking Resident Coordinators (RCs) with leading the UN system’s durable solutions efforts does, however, have the potential to bridge persistent gaps in the nexus approach and UN coordination – provided RCs receive adequate (financial) resources. The review of the IASC’s response to internal displacement, expected to be concluded by the end of 2022, might also include important guidance on how to make humanitarian action more effective for IDPs.

228

 Roth et al., Cycles of Displacement. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/cycles-of-displacement-understanding-violence-discrimination-and-exclusion-of-lgbtqi;
and M. Daigle, ‘How Humanitarians should consider LGBT+ issues in their work’ (London: ODI, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/how-humanitarians-should-consider-lgbt-issues-in-their-work

229

Van Eetvelt et al., ‘What does the evidence say?’. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/what-does-the-evidence-say-a-literature-review-of-the-evidence-on-including-people-with.

230

44% said it was ‘Moderate’ and 29% ‘High’.

231

 Overall, this made it the second largest concern for aid recipients, after ‘Not enough aid’ (34%).

232

Soha BouChabke and Gloria Haddad, ‘Ineffectiveness, poor coordination, and corruption in humanitarian aid: The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon’, International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 32, no. 4 (2021): 894–909. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/ineffectiveness-poor-coordination-and-corruption-in-humanitarian-aid-the-syrian-refugee

233

Abdinur Abdirisak Sofe, ‘Assessment of corruption in the humanitarian assistance in Puntland State of Somalia’, Journal of Financial Crime 27, no. 1 (2020): 104–18. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/assessment-of-corruption-in-the-humanitarian-assistance-in-puntland-state-of-somalia

234

Natasha Hall, Karam Shaar and Munqeth Othman Agha, ‘How the Assad Regime systematically diverts tens of millions in aid’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 October 2021. www.alnap.org/help-library/how-the-assad-regime-systematically-diverts-tens-of-millions-in-aid

235

Philip Kleinfeld, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Congo aid scam triggers sector-wide alarm’, The New Humanitarian, 11 June 2020. www.alnap.org/help-library/exclusive-congo-aid-scam-triggers-sector-wide-alarm

236

OCHA, ‘Statement by the Humanitarian Coordinator in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, David McLachlan-Karr’, The New Humanitarian , 12 June 2020. www.alnap.org/help-library/statement-by-the-humanitarian-coordinator-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-david

237

Nicole Henze, François Grünewald, Sharanjeet Parmar, Operational Review of Exposure to Corrupt Practices in Humanitarian Aid Implementation Mechanisms in the DRC (London: DIFID, 2020). www.alnap.org/help-library/operational-review-of-exposure-to-corrupt-practices-in-humanitarian-aid-implementation

238

This includes the situation on the border of Belarus and Poland, where thousands of refugees were ‘held hostage by a political stalemate’ (Pascale Moreau in UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Urges States to End Stalemate at Belarus-EU Border and Avoid Further Loss of Life’ (News), UNHCR, 22 October 2021. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/ineffectiveness-poor-coordination-and-corruption-in-humanitarian-aid-the-syrian-refugee

239

UNHCR, ‘Ukraine Situation: Flash Update #18’, 24 June 2022. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/ukraine-situation-flash-update-18

240

UNHCR, ‘Refugee Data Finder’, 2021. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/refugee-data-finder

241

Danish Refugee Council, Global COVID-19 Response: Final Report May-December 2020 (Copenhagen: Danish Refugee Council, 2021), 5. See evidence from Jordan, Iraq, Nigeria, Niger and Lebanon. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/global-covid-19-response-danish-refugee-council

242

Laurence Gerhardt, GBV trends among Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar (London/Dhaka: IRC, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/gbv-trends-among-rohingya-refugees-in-cox%E2%80%99s-bazar

243

The CRRF, an annex to the New York Declaration, was piloted between 2015 and 2017 in 15 countries/regional situations that experienced large-scale movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations.

244

To this end it has four objectives: (1) ease the pressure on host countries; (2) enhance refugee self-reliance; (3) expand access to third-country solutions; and (4) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

245

 The Forum was co-hosted by UNHCR and Switzerland, and co-convened by Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Germany, Pakistan and Turkey.

246

 In 2021 UNHCR produced its first monitoring report against the GCR indicator framework, complemented by a progress stock-take produced by IRC, NRC and DRC.

247

Catherine Osborn and Patrick Wall, The Global Compact on Refugees Three Years On: Navigating Barriers and Maximising Incentives in Support of Refugees and Host Countries (Copenhagen/New York/Oslo: DRC, IRC, NRC, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/the-global-compact-on-refugees-three-years-on-navigating-barriers-and-maximising This was a critique on the signing of the GCR – that its model of responsibility sharing was seen as a simple quid pro quo between donors and host governments of ‘you host, we fund’

248

According to Yoon and Smith (2021), , options for mandatory contributions were reportedly ruled out in the GCR negotiations (Priscilla Yoon and Eric Smith, Toward Equitable and Predictable Responsibility Sharing: An Analysis of State Pledges at the Global Refugee Forum (InterAction, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/toward-equitable-and-predictable-responsibility-sharing-an-analysis-of-state-pledges-at)

249

UNHCR, Outcomes of The Global Refugee Forum 2019 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2020). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/outcomes-of-the-global-refugee-forum-2019

250

Yoon and Smith, Equitable and Predictable. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/toward-equitable-and-predictable-responsibility-sharing-an-analysis-of-state-pledges-at

251

See IDA.

252

There is currently no comprehensive tracking of humanitarian, development and private financial flows for refugee situations. OECD is collaborating with UNHCR to develop this refugee financing tracking capability.

253

Lewis Sida and Ed Schenkenberg, Synthesis of Rohingya Response Evaluations of IOM, UNICEF and UNHCR (Geneva: UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, 2019), 18. https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/Bangladesh%2520synthesis%2520Report%2520final%25202019.pdf

254

UNHCR, Two Year Progress Assessment of the CRRF Approach, September 2016 – September 2018 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2018), 13. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/two-year-progress-assessment-of-the-crrf-approach

255

According to Osborn and Wall (Three Years On, 2021, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/two-year-progress-assessment-of-the-crrf-approach), just 22,770 people were resettled in 2020.

256

Danida, Evaluation of the Regional Development and Protection Programme in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq 2014-2017 (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018), 48. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/evaluation-of-the-regional-development-and-protection-programme-in-lebanon-jordan-and

257

Taylor, Glyn, G. Gilbert, S. Hidalgo, M. Korthals Altes, B. Lewis, C. Robinson, E. Sandri, V. Stoianova and J. Ward (2022), COVID-19 Global Evaluation Coalition, “Joint Evaluation of the Protection of the Rights of Refugees during the COVID-19 Pandemic”, UNHCR, Geneva, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/joint-evaluation-of-the-protection-of-the-rights-of-refugees-during-the-covid-19

258

Sida and Schenkenberg, Rohingya Response Evaluations https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/Bangladesh%2520synthesis%2520Report%2520final%25202019.pdf;
Christian Aid, ‘Accountability Assessment Rohingya Response Bangladesh’ (London: Christian Aid, 2018). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/accountability-assessment-rohingya-response-bangladesh

259

Sida and Schenkenberg, Rohingya Response Evaluations, 10. https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/Bangladesh%2520synthesis%2520Report%2520final%25202019.pdf

260

UNHCR, Evaluation of UNHCR’s Country Operation, Afghanistan (Geneva: UNHCR, 2020). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/unhcr-afghanistan-country-evaluation-report-2020

261

Danida, Regional Development and Protection. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/evaluation-of-the-regional-development-and-protection-programme-in-lebanon-jordan-and

262

UNICEF, Evaluation of UNICEF’s Work to Link Humanitarian and Development Programming (New York: UNICEF, 2021), 59. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/evaluation-of-unicefs-work-to-link-humanitarian-and-development-programming

263

Antoine Mansour and Jean Dib Haj, Final Evaluation Report Lebanon Host Communities Support Project (LHSP) 2015-2017 (New York: UNDP, 2018) https://www.alnap.org/help-library/mid-term-evaluation-of-the-lebanese-host-communities-support-project ; Julia Betts et al., Evaluation of the WFP Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (2015-2018) (Rome: WFP, 2018). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/evaluation-of-the-wfp-regional-response-to-the-syrian-crisis-2015-2018

264

Julian Murray, Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Response to the Refugee Crisis in Turkey (European Commission, 2019) https://www.alnap.org/help-library/evaluation-of-the-european-union%E2%80%99s-humanitarian-response-to-the-refugee-crisis-in; Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, Karin Wendt and Sahjabin Kabir, Independent Evaluation of the Aktion Deutschland Hilft e.V. (ADH) Joint Appeal to Rohingya Myanmar Bangladesh (Geneva: HERE, 2019). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/independent-evaluation-of-the-aktion-deutschland-hilft-ev-adh-joint-appeal-to-%E2%80%9Crohingya

265

 Jane Cocking et al., Independent Review of the Implementation of the IASC Protection Policy (London: HPG/ODI, 2022). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/%E2%80%98independent-review-of-the-implementation-of-the-iasc-protection-policy

266

For example the inclusion of protection principles in its memorandum of understanding with the government over the relocation of refugees to the island of Bhasan Char and preventing several thousand people from being moved.

267

Teresa Hanley, Katie Ogwang and Caitlin Procter, Evaluation of UNHCR Prevention and Response to SGBV in the Refugee Population in Lebanon (2016–2018) (Geneva: UNHCR, 2018). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/evaluation-of-unhcr-prevention-and-response-to-sgbv-in-the-refugee-population-in

268

Roth et al., Cycles of Displacement. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/cycles-of-displacement-understanding-violence-discrimination-and-exclusion-of-lgbtqi

269

Cocking et al., IASC Protection Policy. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/%E2%80%98independent-review-of-the-implementation-of-the-iasc-protection-policy

270

Sida and Schenkenberg, Rohingya Response Evaluations. https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/Bangladesh%2520synthesis%2520Report%2520final%25202019.pdf

271

Sida and Schenkenberg, 13. https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/Bangladesh%2520synthesis%2520Report%2520final%25202019.pdf

272

Human Rights Watch, ‘UN shared Rohingya data without informed consent’ (News), Human Rights Watch, 15 June 2021. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent-bangladesh-provided-myanmar

273

 UNHCR, UNHCR Lebanon: Fact Sheet, September 2021 (Geneva: UNHCR, September 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/unhcr-lebanon-fact-sheet-september-2021

274

Nalia. Ahmed et al., ‘Vaccinating refugees: Lessons from the inclusive Lebanon Vaccine Roll-Out Experience’, World Bank, 18 June 2021. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/vaccinating-refugees-lessons-from-the-inclusive-lebanon-vaccine-roll-out-experience

275

UNHCR, ‘Refugee Data Finder’. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/refugee-data-finder

276

UNHCR, Protection Monitoring Findings: Lebanon 1st Quarter 2021 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/protection-monitoring-findings-lebanon-1st-quarter-2021

277

The UNHCR protection monitoring report (2021, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/protection-monitoring-findings-lebanon-1st-quarter-2021) states that ‘1 in 5 refugees (20%) are now forgoing needed healthcare and medicine due to a lack of resources (compared to 15% in the previous quarter)’.

278

LCRP budget requirement for basic assistance in 2019 was $477 million and $530 million in 2022, despite a doubling in people targeted over this period and a 557% increase in price of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket since October 2019, according to LCRP 2022. See: Government of Lebanon and United Nations, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2022–2023 (Government of Lebanon, 2022, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/lebanon-crisis-response-plan-2022-2023).

279

With $352 million carried over from 2020 to 2021

280

The largest of which is multi-purpose cash assistance, which targeted 294,000 households, of which 239,000 were Syrian.

281

Nick Newsom, ‘Aid millions wasted in Lebanese currency collaapse’, The New Humanitarian, 24 March 2021. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/aid-millions-wasted-in-lebanese-currency-collapse

282

WFP, Lebanon: Inter-Agency – Q3 2021 Basic Assistance Dashboard (Geneva: UNHCR, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/lebanon-inter-agency-q3-2021-basic-assistance-dashboard

283

WFP, Lebanon: Inter-Agency. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/lebanon-inter-agency-q3-2021-basic-assistance-dashboard

284

Ibid. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/lebanon-inter-agency-q3-2021-basic-assistance-dashboard

285

 Ibid. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/lebanon-inter-agency-q3-2021-basic-assistance-dashboard

286

UNHCR and UNDP, Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) Regional Strategic Overview 2021–2022 (Geneva/New York: UNHCR and UNDP, 2020).. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/regional-refugee-resilience-plan-3rp-regional-strategic-overview-2021-2022

287

 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021 (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/global-report-on-internal-displacement-2021

288

 IDMC, Internal Displacement 2019. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/global-report-on-internal-displacement

289

IPCC (2021) Summary for Policymakers – Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge, UK/New York, US: Cambridge University Press, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/summary-for-policymakers-climate-change-2021-the-physical-science-basis-contribution-of

290

Classification according to the Notre Dame GAIN Index, calculation and additional details in: IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/global-report-on-internal-displacement-2021

291

 For a sample case study on the impacts of displacement see: IDMC, Impacts of Displacement: Displaced by Violence, Jos, Nigeria (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/impacts-of-displacement-displaced-by-violence-jos-nigeria); and IDMC, Impacts of Displacement: Drought Displacement in Gode Woreda, Ethiopia (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/impacts-of-displacement-drought-displacement-in-gode-woreda-ethiopia).

292

This figure represents the average cost of providing each internally displaced person with support for housing, education, health and security, and their loss of income. For each metric, the average costs and losses per person are assessed for a year of displacement. The impact on livelihoods is based on World Bank data, while the impact on all other areas is based on UNOCHA’s Humanitarian Response Plans and Humanitarian Needs Overviews. For detailed methodology, see: Christelle Cazabat and Marco Tucci, The Ripple Effect: Economic Impacts of Internal Displacement – Unveiling the Cost of Internal Displacement (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/the-ripple-effect-economic-impacts-of-internal-displacement-unveiling-the-cost-of).

293

UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement (online, 2021). https://www.alnap.org/help-library/un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-internal-displacement